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Abstract 
This paper discusses how Genoese bankers collected money at exchange fairs. This money was then 
lent to the King of Spain - through the asientos - from the mid-sixteenth to the early seventeenth 
centuries. Genoese bankers raised capital at the exchange fairs , which were typical short-term credit 
mechanism, where foreign bills of exchange were discounted over a three-month period. The Genoese 
funded long-term obligations by means of short term loans which meant they were able to enforce 
payment to the King and at the same time successfully manage the supply of finance from a large 
number of easily substitutable markets, located in different states. The Bisenzone fair of exchange 
was the forerunner to an efficient, widely integrated international capital market where Genoese pre-
eminence was firmly established  and which the Genoese kept firmly under their control. The success 
of  the Bisenzone fairs of exchange directly challenges the theory which suggests that the laws against 
usury restrained the development of capital markets in early modern Italy. 
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   1 
Introduction 
 
Over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the kings of Spain fought long and 
costly wars and borrowed extensively to finance fluctuations in military 
expenditure. The Crown was financed domestically by means of perpetual 5percent 
bonds – juros – and contracted international credit through the asiento, a short-term 
high interest loan frequently underwritten by foreign merchant bankers. Asientos 
were short term only in principle, and many asientos were issued to roll over other 
asientos that the Crown could not fully pay.  
The King’s main foreign lenders were Genoese bankers, who raised money mainly 
on the fairs of exchange, a short-term international capital market where bills of 
exchange were discounted for three-month periods and frequently renewed. The 
position of the Genoese bankers reminds us of modern-day banks, who loan to less 
developed countries and link the repayment of long-term loans to the provision of 
short-term credit. 
In light of the large sums owed to them by a Crown that underwent several 
“bankruptcies” (in 1557, 1560, 1575, 1596 and 1607), Genoese bankers might have 
been unable to clear the letters of exchange issued on European fairs. The chain of 
trust which linked the Spanish King to the small investor - in the opinion of some 
observers - looked very weak
1. 
This was not the case, however. The main question is how the Genoese were able 
to survive the suspension or rescheduling of payments by their debtors, if their 
creditors proved to be very short-term creditors. The answer is twofold. First, the 
Genoese had the upper hand on their debtor.  They were able to enforce their 
payments to the King of Spain whose subsequent bankruptcies eventually ended in 
debt rescheduling, i.e. swapping long term domestic debt for short term 
international debt
2, so the bankruptcies essentially posed a problem of liquidity
3. 
Second, Genoese bankers were the main actors in the international capital market, 
represented by the fair of Bisenzone, where local crises could be absorbed by other 
financial centers and bills of exchange continued to be cleared.  
The financing operations conducted through the Bisenzone fair can be interpreted 
as loan contracts that offered the borrower fixed rate interest which was unaffected 
by exchange fluctuations. The Bisenzone fair was a Genoese institution which 
operated under Genoese law. Creditors from other cities were drawn to it because 
the interest rates were generally higher than other alternatives on offer, risk could 
be spread among various investors, and the short-term credit instruments 
[described in detail below] were easily rolled over and extended. But this was a 
market ultimately controlled by the Genoese authorities, who could declare 
moratorium on debt contracts and enforce renegotiation upon creditors. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the strategic factors that 
led to the development of the Bisenzone fair of exchange, the Genoese fair, and to 
Genoese enrichment. Section three analyses the fair of Bisenzone in the context of 
the international capital market and discusses the integration of the Genoese market 
with the credit markets in Milan, Florence and Venice, observing the parallel move 
in interest rates expressed in different currencies and their rapid adjustments. The 
financing of  foreign bills of exchange took place through the pactum de ricorsa, 
which was a significant innovation that contrasted the ‘dry exchange’ process 
classically described by De Rover. The laws against loans at interest seem not to 
                                                 
1 Contarini, Istorie, cc. 175r-78r. 
2 The royal “bankruptcy” was in fact a new deal between the king and his creditors. See Thompson, “Castile”. On 
some occasions payments were made in very depreciated juros, according to Peri, Negotiante, pt. 1 , p. 48. 
3 Braudel, Civiltà, pp. 541-43; Conklin, “Theory”.   2 
have restrained the development of capital markets in early modern Italy, despite 
its traditional historiography
4. Conclusions follow. 
 
The fairs of exchange: Bisenzone 
 
Between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, exchange fairs 
succeeded in raising large sums of money in the form of medium and short term 
loans and occupied the center stage of the European financial market. The 
organization of fairs has to be set within the broader context of financial markets in 
Europe at that time. In Italy, several public institutions dealt with credit (the Banco 
di San Giorgio in Genoa, the Banco della Piazza di Rialto and the Banco Giro in 
Venice, the Banco di Sant’ Ambrogio in Milan), but their activities were limited 
mostly to deposits and transfers, together with operations concerning state finance. 
Besides these public institutions, private firms also acted as banks; their reliability, 
though, often left much to be desired and their role within the whole financial 
market was rather limited. Moreover, the development of such institutions, both 
public and private, was strongly influenced by norms against usury. The so-called 
Genoese fairs, founded in Besançon in 1535 (hence the name,  “Bisenzone” which 
was retained even when the fair moved) and transferred to Piacenza in 1579 and 
later to Novi Ligure, provided a device, which among other things, served both to 
avoid ecclesiastic censure and to raise loans in a period of great tension.  
Moving the fairs from Lyon to Piacenza brought about a twofold change that 
occurred in the European capital market between the late sixteenth and the early 
seventeenth centuries. Firstly, unlike the typical late-medieval fairs, the fair of 
Bisenzone set up a financial market which was completely unbound by commercial 
activities. Secondly, a relatively restricted group of Genoese bankers succeeded in 
exercising control over major financial mechanisms.  
The difficulties of the Lyon market weakened the role played by Tuscan financiers, 
who were traditionally tied to the French Crown: this context led to the emergence 
of Genoese bankers, who were consolidating their relations with Castile and 
establishing themselves as the main interlocutors of the Habsburg treasury, at least 
up until the 1630s
5. Despite the exploitation of the imported commodities from 
America, Castile had to cope with a serious gap between its own financial means 
and the enormous need to finance its grandiose imperial policy. The desperate need 
for money was one of the common features that characterized the policy of Charles 
V and his successors until the end of the seventeenth century. In the early 1570s, 
for example, the cost of the Spanish army which was engaged in the war in 
Flanders, was estimated to be 1.2 million florins a month, while only half this 
amount was actually available
6. The most important task of the Spanish Crown was 
to ensure a regular flow of payments to the troops engaged at the various fronts. 
Since the much needed funds were not received on a regular basis, and the royal 
administrators could not transfer the money required, it was necessary to rely on 
money advanced by financiers. The latter were responsible for making payments at 
due dates, on agreed locations, and in accepted local coinage; the King, on the 
other hand, was committed to paying back the amount in accepted coinage or in 
precious metal by an agreed date.  
Repayments were made in Spain or, after 1580, either in Italian or Antwerp in 
accordance with  a pre-established exchange agreement. Lenders, moreover, 
enjoyed the privilege of carrying out of Spain an amount of silver as collateral 
                                                 
4 Neal, “How it all began”. 
5 Da Silva, Banque, p. 196; Boyer-Xambeau, Deleplace, Gillard, Banchieri, pp. 303 ff. 
6 Parker, Army, p. 136.   3 
which was equal to the sum granted as a loan (licencias de saca)
7. This deal, 
known as asiento, implied a short term loan by the financiers to the King. 
Furthermore, there was another kind of asiento, usually signed by the Spanish 
governor in Flanders: the governor, in urgent need for money, underwrote a loan to 
be paid back at a later date by the Treasury in Spain. The borrowing capacity of the 
Spanish Crown was strengthened both by the influx of American silver from the 
mid-sixteenth century onwards and the assignment of tax collection to the bankers.  
Continuous delays with payments and the mounting up of arrears provoked a series 
of mutinies that endangered the outcome of the war against the United Provinces. It 
was necessary, therefore, to ensure a constant flow of cash to the troops, who 
insisted that their wages be paid in silver and gold coins, to protect them from the 
constant debasement of the petty currency
8. Between 1520-32 and 1552-56 the 
amount of debt through asientos increased from 5.4 to 9.6 millions ducats and 
before 1608 – the first year of truce with the United Provinces – about 68% of the 
money raised through asientos was directed to the Flanders. Resort to asientos  was 
onerous because of the difficulty of the Crown to reimburse lenders in due time
9 
A great deal of these flows was under Genoese control. It has been argued that in 
the years 1598-1609 the bankers of the Ligurian republic lent straight to the 
Spanish Crown about 33 million ducats, namely 88% of the whole amount of loans 
signed by the King. Likewise, in the years 1623-26 the Genoese provided 
13,664,000 ducats
10.  It is just from 1579 that “Bisenzone” began to play a crucial 
role for the international payment system. At Bisenzone, in fact, Genoese bankers 
succeeded in changing their credits in Spanish silver into foreign bills of exchange 
in gold provided by Tuscan, Lombard, and above all Venetian merchants. The high 
Venetian demand for silver was due to the fact that Rialto at that time was one of 
the most important centers for the redistribution of silver to the Levant, where 
silver could be exchanged with gold at a very favorable rate.
11  
The success of the Genoese fairs is proved by the volume of business. It has been 
argued that between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries the total value of 
transactions in one year could be as high as forty million gold scudi
12. But, besides 
their unquestionable aptitude in raising money from various markets, Genoese 
hegemony was sustained by the favorable balance of trade enjoyed by Italy 
compared with that of Spain, Southern Flanders and Germany
13.  
There was no need to transfer gold: gold piled up in Antwerp because of the 
healthy turnover of trade in Flanders. Flanders had a surplus balance with Northern 
Europe (Germany, England) and accumulated gold and silver.
14 
The Genoese could get their hands on silver through their commitment to pay gold 
to the Spanish troops in Flanders. As long as the Spanish were prepared to continue 
their 80 years war with Flanders, Genoa and most of the towns along the Bisenzone 
                                                 
7 Secondly, the license to export gold or silver was very attractive because of the fees which could later be charged 
to merchants needing to remit in either gold or silver to other trade centers. Profits to the bankers therefore came 
from the commission, the exchange and the license to export precious metals. Major lenders received political 
benefits as well: appointments as royal officers, grants of fiefs and various privileges. 
8 Vàzquez de Prada , “Uomini”, p. 255; Braudel Civiltà, pp. 539-40; but also Quatrefages, Tercios, pp.184-85. 
9 Gelabert, Castile, pp. 207-216. 
10 Doria, “Conoscenza”, pp. 69-70. In 1607 royal income in Castile was 12,5 million ducats; and in the years 1621-
40 it averaged about 17 millions. Thompson, “Castile”, p. 157. 
11 This was another reason why Venetian  merchants opposed an attempt by the Senate to prohibit exchanges with 
the Genoese in 1639. See Mandich, Pacte, p. 33 n.15.On gold/silver ratio in Europe and Asia, Kindleberger, 
Spenders, pp. 74-75; Pezzolo, Economia, p. 95. Trade with the Levant was paid either through barter or by sending 
silver. Foreign bills of exchange were not an accepted means of payment.  
12 Felloni, “Asientos”, p. 534. 
13 Braudel, Civiltà, p. 534 ; Brulez, “Exportation”;  Goris, Etudes, p. 319 ; and Lettres, p. 66. 
14 On this point Chaudhuri, “Economic Problems”, pp. 339-344 and Brulez, “Handelsbalans”, pp. 304-309.   4 
transfer route, could sell gold at very favorable prices in exchange for silver and 
this was one of the contributing factors to their increased wealth.
15 
The role of the Genoa transfer route progressively declined after the 1607 
suspension: the Genoese were no longer able to face the growing needs of the King 
who quickly turned to the Portuguese
16. Portuguese bankers were willing to 
provide the money needed to meet the increasing demands of the monarchy and so 
replaced the Genoese – although not completely – from 1626
17.  The Portuguese 
phase lasted up to 1650, when the Dutch seized their profits from the Far East and 
Brazil. The emergence of Portuguese financial aid, however, marked the 
replacement of the Mediterranean financial circuits with a broader system which 
centred on the Atlantic and Asian trade.   
 
Collecting money at the fair. 
 
The Genoese fairs of exchange were places where bankers met in order to either 
pay off former deals or make new ones
18. These fairs can be regarded as 
forerunners of the modern clearing houses, for operators could offset their credits 
and debits and regulate the balance either by issuing foreign bills of exchange on 
their creditors or by buying a particular currency of account which was the Scudo 
di Marco.  
However, the function of the Genoese fairs was not limited to clearing accounts or 
even to currency exchange. Bisenzone performed a financing operation as well;  
silver was received from time to time, while gold for the army was to be paid 
regularly, to avoid military revolts
19. This was accomplished through the typical 
instrument of the fairs - the “rechange” (pactum de ricorsa).  
An exchange transaction consisted of supplying local currency against the delivery 
of foreign currency abroad at maturity. Exchange took place through the issue of a 
commercial bill. Foreign bills of exchange were the most widely used means of 
payment at the time: payment in gold, silver (coined or bullion) was much more 
expensive and unsafe and the use of metal was limited to trade with more distant 
countries
20. 
The financial bill or “rechange” transaction involved repeating the exchange 
transaction in reverse. The payee of the original bill was now the remitter and the 
original payer became the drawer. At the end of a “rechange” operation, the 
original drawer had his loan repaid, gross of  interest and in the same currency in 
                                                 
15 See footnote 5 and Braudel, Civiltà, p.539. 
16 Girard, “Etrangers”; Castillo Pintado,”Monarchie espagnole”; Boyajian, Portuguese; Broens, Monarquia. 
17 Bitossi, Governo. 
18 Bisenzone was the only fair  where credit and debits could balance internationally, from Florence to Kracov. 
Other Italian fairs, such as Verona or other minor fairs, were never able to attract foreign bankers, who did not 
have their correspondents in Verona, or in other small towns, and so were not able to pay their bills and cash their 
credits there. See Mandich, Pacte, p.111, n.79.  
Fairs are seen as the precursors to the clearing houses, since bankers could clear their credits and debits and pay 
the balance through the issue of foreign  bills of exchange addressed to their creditors or through the purchase of a 
conventional currency which was the Scudo di Marco.  
For a description of the working of the fairs and the role of Venice in the early 16
th century, see Contarini, 
Historie, c. 175r 
19 Boyer-Xambeau, Deleplace, Gillard, “Crise”, p.154. 
20 Spain had a passive balance with other European countries because of its imperial policy and the war in the 
United Provinces which was balanced by exporting silver from America. One important transfer route of silver 
was through Genoa and  Northern Italian towns. Venice played an important role in this. Venice was in debt 
because of her silver imports. It had a passive trade balance with the Levant, which was paid in silver, and an 
active trade balance with Northen Europe. Part of the Venetian surplus to certain North European countries, such 
as Germany and France, served to repay the imported silver, through the transfer of gold payments to the King of 
Spain in Antwerp. The transfer payment was through the issue of foreign bills of exchange requesting the North 
European debtors at the Antwerp fair, to pay gold on behalf of the Venetians, to the soldiers fighting for the King 
of Spain. There was no need to transfer gold: gold piled up in Antwerp because of the  positive Flemish  balance 
of trade. Flanders had a surplus balance with Northern Europe (Germany, England) and cumulated gold and silver.    5 
which it had originally been conceded. When the obligation matured, it was self-
liquidating. But the parties to the “loan-via-rechange” could agree to renew it for 
one or more returns. In such a way the “exchange-rechange” lost any connection to 
trade and appeared as a pure financing transaction
21. 
The pactum de ricorsa, which formalized the financing transaction in Genoese law, 
was an agreement by which a bill drawn on a fair was automatically redrawn at 
rates established by fair officials. In Bisenzone the rate of redraft – and thus the 
rate of interest – was fixed  at the time the loan contract was drawn up. Through the 
device of exchange  and “rechange” a wide area of savers was involved in the 
system of international finance.
22 Although some “rechange”contracts  date back to 
from the thirteenth century
23, they experienced their major diffusion in the Genoese 
fairs between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, with the increasing 
demand for money from the Spanish Crown.  
In its simplest form exchange/”rechange” financing in Bisenzone can be illustrated 
by reworking the following example from a contemporary merchant, 
Giandomenico Peri
24.  
The King of Spain was in need of a large amount of money in Antwerp (500,000 
ducats), which he did not have, and there were no merchants in Madrid able to 
credit such a huge amount of money in Antwerp on the King’s account. The King 
sold (passa) an asiento to a Genoese negotiante in Madrid, as the grounds for 
lending him money for the stated amount, to be paid in Antwerp at the expiry date, 
il servitio. The negotiante ordered his correspondent in Genoa to transfer 500,000 
ducats to Antwerp. The correspondent in Genoa issued a bill of exchange to raise 
the sum at the fair from merchant bankers in Genoa, Milan and Florence. Let us 
consider Milan only. The Milanese had the bill immediately accepted by a 
Milanese banker (rechanger) by promising him immediate “rechange”, so as to 
delay payment until the next fair. “Rechange” meant that the correspondent, with 
the proceeds of the bill drawn on the rechanger, was able to purchase a bill drawn 
on Genoa which would not mature until the next fair.  
At the fair, the drawee, who was faced with the need to raise fresh cash to deal with 
the rather infrequent repayments made by the King of Spain, sent the bill of 
exchange and used  “rechange” as a form of financing. The second part of this 
operation, the “rechange”, ended a cycle that in principle lasted a trimester, but that 
could be extended to several years. 
The stage, where the protagonists are the imperial government in Madrid, the 
soldiers of the tercios in Flanders, the Flemish and Italian merchants, the Genoese 
financiers and a great deal of investors all had the exchange fairs of “Bisenzone” as 
a common backdrop.  
 
The mechanism of the Bisenzone fair . 
 
Fairs were held four times a year: the fair of the Presentation at the temple on 
February 1
st; the Easter fair on May 2
nd; the third fair on August 1
st, and lastly the 
fair of All Saints on November 2
nd. Each fair lasted eight days and followed 
specific procedures. On the first day every banker or cambista - people dealing 
with exchanges - established his net balance towards the others. The rate of 
exchange was fixed according to reciprocal credits and debits and, the third day, a 
bilateral offset of credits and debits took place. All this was immediately sorted out  
because operations were based on a common currency which was the Scudo di 
                                                 
21 Mandich, Pacte, p. 57; Boyer-Xambeau, Deleplace, Gillard, “Crise”. 
22 Mandich, Pacte, pp. 83 ff. 
23 Mueller, Venetian money, pp. 288-94. 
24 Peri, Negotiante, pt. 2, p. 82.   6 
Marco. At the close of the fair a general settlement was carried out. Since bankers 
at the fair represented the major markets, the credits and debits usually balanced 
out or were made to balance
25. 
Exchange  and “rechange” at the fairs were the result of an agreement: nations 
participating in the fair elected a panel of bankers who, along with the Magistrate, 
fixed the rate of exchange to be used during the fair: this procedure was called ‘to 
put account’ or ‘exchange or price of account’
26. Exchange and “rechange” were 
set in units of money against an ideal unit, the Scudo di Marco. The Scudo di 
Marco was convertible into gold at a fixed rate, 100 Scudo di Marco against 101 
gold Scudo delle cinque stampe (namely the Scudo of Venice, Milan, Genoa, 
Naples, and Castile)
27; but it is worth pointing out that convertibility was more an 
exception rather than the rule, for it was seldom requested or at least only for small 
amounts, when there was a situation of  imbalance
28. 
The exchange rate negotiated at the fair was not an obligatory market price 
(manual exchange). It was agreed by the bankers’ committee and was written on 
the bill of exchange. It was referred to as cambio aereo, a name that reflected its 
conventional nature
29. 
Furthermore, the price of  “rechange” included a return on the credit period, an 
interest term
30. The official price of exchange and “rechange” ‘should provide to 
the creditor a non uncertain return. These prices are strongly disrupted by 
movements in the value of the different metallic moneys’
31. In fact, the price of 
“rechange” included  coverage for exchange rate variations: “rechange” was a 
guaranteed agreement as the overall price of financing in foreign currency was 
settled at the start. “Rechange” was essentially a spurious exchange rate 
transaction. It was a straight loan in foreign currency, covered for exchange rate 
risks. From this operation, the lender expected a return which was stipulated 
beforehand between the parties by fixing the “rechange” price
32.  
“Rechange” differs substantially from de Roover’s dry exchange. According to de 
Roover’s dry exchange transaction, the return was not stipulated beforehand and 
neither the lender nor the borrower could foresee how the exchange rate would 
swing, so that the return was always uncertain thus legitimating interest on short-
term credits
33. Under Genoese law the lenders were allowed to guarantee the rate of 
“rechange” on a foreign bill of exchange sent back to repay the original lender. 
The operation had several advantages. First, the lender received a return, since the 
sum that the borrower returned was always higher than the sum initially advanced. 
This was because the spot Scudo di Marco exchange rate was generally lower than 
its “rechange rate”; eventually the difference between the two rates, net of 
commission, represented the price that the borrower had to pay in order to obtain a 
loan on the market. Second, even if the transaction consisted, under all respects, of 
                                                 
25 A credit balance, usually, gave rise to a demand for lending, so as to fruitfully employ the available capital and 
avoid payment in specie. See Mandich, Pacte, p.112. 
26 Mandich, “Fiere”, pp. 263-64; Peri, Negotiante, pt. 1, p. 76. 
27 Peri, Negotiante, pt. 2, p. 63; Felloni, Moneta, p. 97 n.70; Mandich, ”Fiere”, p. 258. 
28 Mandich, Pacte, p. 45; Mueller, Venetian money. 
29 Boyer-Xambeau, Deleplace, Gillard “Crise”, p. 46; Rosselli, “Early views”, p. 66. 
30 This mechanism, indeed existed well before: the flow of credit from Florence to Venice depended on specie 
demand driven by the merchant galleys sailing to Levant in Spring (Mueller, Venetian money, p. 306); but one of 
the novelties introduced by the Genoese fairs is that now cycles of payment are marked by three-monthly fairs. 
31 Mandich, Pacte, p. 57. 
32 In this rechange differs substantially from dry exchange. The return, in dry exchange, is not stipulated 
beforehand and neither the lender nor the borrower could foresee how the exchange rate would swing. See de 
Roover, ”What is dry exchange?”, p. 264. 
33 de Roover, “What is dry exchange?”, p.264. 
   7 
a loan, the two operations – exchange and “rechange” – were formally 
independent, and therefore interest payment did not fall within usury law
34. 
“Rechange” lasted from one fair to another, but they were frequently rolled over, 
and evidence points to an average duration of one year; there is also evidence of 
continuous renewed rechanges that spanned nearly a decade
35. They produced an 
annual yield that oscillated at around 10%. In the more complex cases, various 
fairs, various currencies and various intermediaries were involved. 
“Rechange” was a widespread practice. It had become an everyday way of 
investing funds, not only by merchant bankers but also by people who found 
themselves with cash in hand. Orders to agents and power of attorney included 
exchange as an investment opportunity to be exploited
36. There is evidence that the 
same government (the Florentine Medici and the Venetian Senate in the 15
th 
century) became involved in borrowing on “rechange”
37. 
The strength of “rechange” over a foreign bill of exchange was the guarantee 
provided by the lender, by offering the lender a secured rate of interest, even in the 
crucial decades of the Genoese financial hegemony, between 1570 and 1620. This 
explains how the Genoese were able to tap into the entire northern Italian merchant 
community for funds that could be subsequently loaned to the King of Spain, 
despite his frequent refinancing during this period and the vigor with which the 
magistrates of the two republics of Genoa and Venice defended the contract  of the 
pactum de ricorsa against ecclesiastic prohibition
38.  
 
Exchange  and “rechange”. 
 
“Rechange”is an agreement by which buyers and sellers agree to exchange 
currencies at the next exchange fair. Lenders are typically bankers or cambisti, 
acting on behalf of other people, and one reason why bankers or cambisti enter a 
“rechange” market is that they can be sure of the amount of foreign currency they 
will receive on exchange of their present loan. In fact bankers engaging in 
“rechange” avoid exchange rate risks by offsetting their assets and liabilities in 
Scudo di marco.  
Bankers, on the third day of the fair, calculate exchange and “rechange” rates. The 







LG/S - 1                (8) 
where R
t+1
LG/S is the rechange rate calculated in t, Lira Genoese for 1 Scudo di 
Marco, referring to the next fair, E
t
LG/S is the spot exchange rate (cambio aereo), 
i
t
LG/S is the domestic interest rate expressed in Scudi di Marco, where financing is 
realized by drafting bills in Lira. 
Interest rates are calculated for the currencies for which we have a larger and more 
complete data set, Lira and Soldo Milanese. The starting point reflects data 
availability (1590, Presentation); the end point (1621, All Saints) is the last fair 
before transfer to Novi Ligure
39. The average quarterly rate of interest was 2%, 
                                                 
34 de Roover, “What is dry exchange?”, p. 254. Particularly when rechange was paid in a fair different from the 
fair where the previous transaction was negotiated. A decree of Pius V of 1571 condemned dry exchanges, i.e. a 
bill of exchange from A to B and a subsequent bill, to take the proceeds back, from B to A, as the deal was 
considered artificially split into two, for the purpose of hiding interest payment. Transactions involving different 
fairs might imply, instead, a legitimate deal, such as a mercantile transaction or transfer of money from one place 
to the other, and so avoided breaking ecclesiastic laws. See Felloni, Moneta, p. 95; de Roover, “What is dry 
exchange?”, p. 252. 
35 Mandich, Pacte, ch.3. 
36 Ibid., pp.128-29; Mueller, Venetian money, pp. 336-37. 
37 Mueller, Venetian money, pp. 337-39. 
38 Mandich, Pacte, pp. 115-54. 
39 The average number of bills of exchange dealt in Genoese fairs had a rapid decline thereafter (Felloni, 
“Asientos”).   8 
while there was no trend in debasement of either the Genoese or Milanese 
currencies and therefore, on average, the exchange rate was fixed at the relative 
metallic ratios. Covering for exchange rate fluctuations is a cost that was borne by 
the creditor: the cost is measured by the deviations between the “rechange” and the 
spot exchange rate at t+1. It was a risky operation; fair exchange rates had 
relatively large plus or minus fluctuations, but the average gain or loss, over the 
long run was nil. 
 
Table 1. Bisenzone. Interest and exchange variations in various currencies. 
Quarterly data.  
 
Exchange  rate variations  Interest  Currency 
average  st. dev.  average  st. dev. 
Genoa° 0.00  1.18  1.91  0.91 
Milan° -0.11  1.48  2.05  0.81 
Genoa* 0.02  1.16  1.81  0.89 
Venice* -0.12  1.56  1.74  0.94 
Genoa§ 0.05  1.10  1.91  0.79 
Florence§ù§§° -0.06 1.15  1.35  0.79 
Source and method:  
°1590 August-1621 August. 
*1600 Easter -1621 August. 
§ 1601 All saints-1606 Easter and 1608 All saints-1621 August. 
 Source: Da Silva, Banque.  
 
The exchange deviations were not negligible and were the result of several factors; 
current account imbalances, current conditions of the money market, rumors about 
the silver shipped to Spain not arriving on time (i.e. on the forecasted conditions at 
maturity) and on the legal parity. Cambio aereo was a unit of account, but was not 
independent from the market rate of exchange. The exchange-rechange  contract 
was usually provided with an escape clause to the debtor’s advantage, allowing for 
the abandonment of the obligation and paying cash, if rechange at the agreed price 
were to prove too expensive due to a decline of the market price over time
40. It was 
always possible to truncate the bill of exchange operation and to buy at the market 
price, manual exchange, the currency needed to pay the amount of the debt
41. Cash 
had a cost, a premium or agio, over and above that of bank money: the commission 
to the cash broker who purchased specie and, on occasions, a tax
42. 
Eventually the cambio aereo or exchange rate at the fair could differ from the 
market rate of exchange but not systematically and only for a limited amount: 
should the market rechange and the next fair market exchange rate have diverged 
significantly, the entire finance mechanism would have been truncated by the 
debtor and would have eventually collapsed. Cambio aereo and the market rate of 





                                                 
40  In a negotiation in which each party can renege on his contractual obligation, Cambio aereo needs to shadow 
the market rate. See also Greif, “Fundamental problem”, p. 254. 
41 Peri, Negotiante, pt. 3, pp.79-80. 
42 Mueller, Venetian money, pp. 346-47, reporting the course of a draft on Venice by Vincenzo Priuli in London 
(1505-1506) estimates such costs at no less than 5%.   9 
Bisenzone. A Genoese institution. 
 
Bankers and exchange dealers (mercanti di conto) acting at the fair were limited in 
number but they would act not only on their own account but also for the account 
of other debtors and creditors whom they represented and who were not present at 
the fair. Thus, the fair’s clearing system acquired a very wide scope and had a large 
turnover. Bankers had the support of high ranking people and were requested to 
supply heavy caution money. 
The fairs were actually a Genoese institution and the prominent role of the Genoese 
was firmly established. The Consul and the Magistrate were Genoese (although 
assisted by a Milanese and by representatives of other markets) as were the 
majority (2/3) of the advisors and of the Judge of the Court of Appeal
43.  
Payments in specie depended on the arrival of silver and gold that was directed to 
the asentista from the American mines. Delays arose from many causes and were 
rather frequent. In such cases, fairs were frequently delayed and in the most severe 
circumstances a moratorium was declared by the Magistrate postponing payments 
to the following fair. An interest was established for the delay and capitalized. The 
Genoese controlled the entire information process. Moratorium decisions that 
followed delays upon the arrival of the Spanish galleons were clearly in favour of 
Genoese debtors and burdened their creditors
44. The same was true for the short –
term extension of the fairs
45. 
Delays only marginally affected the fairs because precious metal would eventually 
arrive and because coinage was only of use in paying/cashing net balances. 
Liquidation of  net balances was of limited importance because the bigger the fair 
the more numerous were the transactions that were multilaterally balanced out and 
the less important was the ability to pay in cash. In their heyday, the Genoese fairs 
had the largest share of compensation over total payments compared with the other 
fairs
46. 
Fairs were a Genoese jurisdiction and this institutional arrangement supplemented 
the self-enforcing contractual relations between bankers in different fairs
47. 
 
Equilibrium interest rates. 
 
The success of a cambista, a lender on foreign exchange, lay in his ability to 
foresee the movement of the various exchange rates, in his own city and other 
commercial and financial centres. He had to plan his credit supply in order to 
exploit the divergences among the different exchange rates, which corresponded to 
the vagaries in the demand for credit: a fall in the local rate or an increase in the 
foreign rate would have increased the lender’s profit and viceversa. The Cambista, 
therefore, had to be aware of the seasonal tendencies of the European money 
markets and, at the same time, had to keep up with any news that could influence 
the rate of exchange in the short term. 
The Cambista at a fair of exchange had the opportunity to negotiate in various 
currencies chosen on the basis of the market where the bills of exchange were 
drawn - the drawee market. The price of “rechange” was a function of the 
                                                 
43 Da Silva, Banque, p. 76. 
44 According to Da Silva, ibid., pp. 167-69, the arrival delays of the ships from the Americas, explain all delays in 
maturity agreed on Bisenzone. 
45 Ibid., pp. 83-84. Fairs instead guarantee the fiscal exemption on such operations: agents do not communicate, so 
transactions are not taxed. See ibid., p. 70. 
46 Ibid., pp.135-40.Da Silva presents some examples where compensation accounts for roughly 1/5 of total 
payments (the sum of exchange and rechange operations. 
47 Greif, “Fundamental problem”, p. 264. The Genoese operated with all currencies, but all deals in Lira were 
carried out by Genoese bankers.   10 
larghezza (ease) or strettezza (tighteness) of the drawee market, and it reflected the 
conditions of the local money markets. 
The demand for foreign exchange for this purpose would depend not only on the 
interest rates in the two currencies, but also on the expected exchange rate at 
investment maturity. Two factors had to be considered when evaluating the 
investment: 1) the rate of interest; 2) the effect of the appreciation of the foreign 
currency (a positive adjustment) or of the depreciation (a negative adjustment)
48. 
Money raising was not confined to the Ligurian city. Some evidence shows that in 
Venice, for example, a great deal of money was invested through Genoese and 
Tuscan bankers dealing with exchange fairs
49. In a competitive financial market 
any  cambista had to be impartial in dealing with both domestic and foreign 
investments and between foreign investments in different markets and currencies, 
working with a given level of expectations on exchange rate variations and at a 
given level of risk. Any investor would expect to earn the same rate of return, 
regardless of the currency in which the investment was denominated  (Lira, Soldo 
or other currencies)
50. 
On average “Rechange” rolled over 4 or 5 fairs. The overall financing can be 
considered the result of the iteration of an elementary operation between two 
successive fairs, so the choice of the currency on which to secure a debt might be 
broken down into a sequence of simple operations from fair to fair.  
Let us examine the exchange-rechange between t and t+1.  
















SM/S)     (2) 
 
There could be a constant in the relationship as different bankers are involved, and 














SM/S)     (3) 
 
Under perfect capital mobility, β = 1 and the real interest rates should be equal. If 








SM/S and interest rates 
are balanced. 
Under the above condition, a Lira invested in Bisenzone for three months, 
subsequently converted into a Scudo di Marco at the fair exchange rate and 
reconverted, together with interest, back into Lira at maturity with possible 
fluctuations in the exchange rate already accounted for, would equal the return 
from a Soldo invested in Bisenzone for three months, after converting the Soldo in 
Scudo di Marco at the fair exchange rate and the principal plus the interest rate 
back to Lira at maturity, taking into account the possible default risk connected to 
the debtor’s trustworthiness. 
                                                 
48 Appreciation  or depreciation is a measure of risk connected with investment in different currencies. It is 
measured by the exchange rate variance and can influence investment decisions according to the propensity 
toward risk of the different investors. Assume that a large variability will probably not be adeguately covered and 
will leave some risk for the exchange dealer. 
49 Venice played a crucial role, considering its active balance with Flanders which put her bankers in a very solid 
position. See Mandich, Pacte, p. 94. 
50 The relevance of the three markets can be estimated from data on protested bills of exchange: in the early the 
seventeenth century, Milan, Venice and Lyon were the most prominent markets for negotiating bills of exchange 
‘originating’ in Bisenzone. See Da Silva, Banque, pp.118-19. 
51 The subscript has the sole purpose of showing how a banker negotiated: in this case the initial financing was in 
Lira; it was subsequently converted into Scudo di Marco to eventually return Lira to the Genoese.   11 
Transactions in different currencies might not diverge, in general, from profitability 
in Lira, given that correspondents of Genoese bankers were frequently very active 
in the most important markets and currencies: they knew the markets and 
transacted in different currencies for a modest commission. For example a Genoese 
financer, who was willing to raise sums in Milan in Soldo had to pay several 
commissions, but the overall amount was limited: a commission on “rechange” of 
0.33%  and another for the agents and correspondents that was usually kept 
somewhere between 0.25 and 0.50%
52. The cost of financing in a currency which 
was not the financer currency and which was independent from the market where 
funding was raised, could be estimated, according to an example reported by Da 
Silva, at between 1 and 2%
53, subject to variations depending on the amount 
transacted. The commission was paid by the Genoese, who transacted in Soldo, and 
by the Milanese, who transacted in Lira.
54  
Transaction costs, cost of information and the like built a no-transaction band 
around parity and allowed for some margin of variation. If the interest differential 
stayed within the no-transaction band, capital could flow, with a certain degree of 
freedom, among the different markets and at the agreed prices there was no room 
left for competitive arbitrage between different currencies, taken two by two.  
The commission was influenced by divergences in market rates of interest,   
specific market crises, the intervention of the local authorities and market 
disruptions, as already noted. 
 
A test of capital markets integration. 
 
Before moving on to a formal test of the integration of short term financing 
operations in the different fairs and given the fixed exchange rates prevailing at the 
time,  the co-movements of relative interest rates will be examined (figure 1). 
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52 Boyer-Xambeau, Deleplace, Gillard, Banchieri, p. 48; Peri, Negotiante, pt. 1, pp. 89-98, 166-80; Ghilino, 
Banchiere, p.16. It reached 1.5%-2% when the endorsement (fidanza) was added. It seems that endorsement was 
frequent with rechange operations (Lapeyre, “Contribution”, p. 121). 
The market commission varied according to the fairs. It is reported to be 0.66 in Lyon and reached 1.66 in Messina 
and Palermo (Boyer-Xambeau, Deleplace, Gillard, Banchieri, p. 48). 
53 Da Silva, Banque, p. 312. 
54 ‘…ils ordonnaient de remettre 2.500 écus  à Palerme ou à Messine, là ou’ le cors était le plus élevé, et de tirere 
un somme identique sur l’autre de ces places, si entre les deux il y avait une difference d’un denim carlino. Ces 
changes doulbles leur rapportaient ainsi un gain de 2%, car les conditions demendées se réaliserènt: Messine cota 
331/2 et Palerme, 34.’ Da Silva, Banque, p. 312, reported from Peri, Negotiante, pt. 1, pp.129-30.   12 
 
 Interest rates in Soldo and Florentine Ducat are positively correlated with Lira 
interest but for a couple of periods. The correlation remains rather strong once one 
starts to examine the first differences; it fades away with the 1606 crisis and 
recovers slightly four or five years later. This crisis completely separated 
Bisenzone from Venice and Florence and the previous strong link with Milan was 
weakened. According to Da Silva the crisis lasted 6 years and marks a sharp break 
in the series. Interest rates peaked in Genoa in 1593-94,  1596, 1602-03 and in 
1606-07  (tempi periculosi e difficili)
55 together with the King of Spain’s default of 
payment leading to the stringency of the money market in Genoa. The following 
were all associated with positive interest premiums
56: Philip II’s bankruptcy in 
1596  tightened the bankers credit primarily in Genoa; the crisis due to the delay in 
silver shipments in 1606; the enforced delay in payments and the agreed low 
interest rate in Genoa (negative interest differentials at the1606 Easter and August 
fairs) together with the subsequent announcement of a new suspension by the King 
of Spain and the tightening of the Genoese money market in 1608. After all that, 
credit conditions were relieved and interest in Genoa reached a comparatively low 
level when gold and silver finally arrived in abundant supply
57.  
The correlation between Lira  and Venice Grosso is rather weak and its  absence 
marks the structural separation between these two markets. 
 








1590.3-1606.3  1608.4-1621.3 1600.2-1621.3 1601.4-1606.2 1608.4-1621.3 
interest  0.73  0.28 0.25 0.63 0.16 
Δinterest  0.59  0.24 0.19 0.42 -0.06 
Da Silva, Banque. 
  
The integration of the foreign bills of exchange market between Genoa and Milan 
is tested first in terms of deviations between couples of equilibrium interest rates. 
The exchange rate is fixed except for temporary deviations, as suggested by 
exchange rate time series data (table 1), and since expected variations in the 
exchange rate are on average zero, the term in brackets in equation (3) can be 




LG/S = α + i
t 
SM/S + dt         ( 4 )  
                                                 
55 Spinola’s correspondence reported in Da Silva , Banque, p. 591,n.174. 
56 Da Silva, Banque, p.312. 
 
57 The large arrival of silver and gold in Genoa are documented by the representatives of Florence, Venice and 
Mantua and reported in table 46 by Da Silva, Banque, p. 171.   13 
Figure 2. Deviations between the three months interest rate on rechange in Scudo di 







































































































































dt represents the deviations from the arbitrage condition in period t. If deviations 
between the two interest rates are permanent in nature (i.e., non-stationary) the 
theory can be straight reject. Table 1 has already provided evidence that the 
difference in interest rates is stationary with expected value of zero. Deviations dt 
are charted in figure 2. They oscillate at around zero, with constant variance. A 
band constructed around zero ± 1.5%  includes the majority of relative 
observations in the period 1590-1621 (10% of the total quarterly observations 
remain outside the band).  During the crisis of 1606 Lira interest rate was higher 
than Soldo interest, as Genoa was more directly influenced by the delay in the 




Co-integration offers an alternative and more informative method for checking the 
theory. If the zero arbitrage condition holds, the sequence formed by i
t 
LG/S should 
be co-integrated with the sequence of the rates of interest in different currencies,  
expressed in Scudi di Marco (i
t
J/S, J = SM, GV, DF). The arbitrage condition 
assertains that a linear combination exists in the form of  i
t
LG/S  = a0 + a1i
t 
J/S + ut 
such that the error process  ut   is stationary, or I(0), and the co-integrating vector is 
such that a0 differs insignificantly from zero and a1 from unity (no interest rate 
premium). 
The estimation strategy advanced by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith has been applied
59. 
At the first stage the existence of the long run relation between the two interest 
rates is tested by computing the F-stat. to test the significance of the lagged levels 
of the  variables in the error correction form of the underlying Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) model (δ1 = δ2 = 0).At the second stage the coefficients of 
the long run relation are estimated. 
The maximum order of the lags has been chosen according to the Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion and the result is (0,1). The error correction version of the 

















t      (5) 
 
The long run relation (t values in brackets) is 
Genoese Lira - Milanese Soldo.1590.3-1606.1 
i
t




 (-0.13718)  (5.1250) 
                                                 
58 Letters sent to Mantua in 3.6.1606, reported by Da Silva, Banque, p. 168 n.1. 
59 Pesaran, Shin, Smith, “Testing”.   14 
Genoese Lira - Milanese Soldo.1590.3-1621.3 
i
t




 (0.14153)  (5.3906) 
Genoese Lira– Venetian Grosso.1600.2-1621.3 
i
t




 (3.0840) (2.1281) 
Genoese Lira - Florentine Ducat.1600.2-1621.3 
i
t
LG/S = 0.42281 + 1.0472i
t
FD/S  +  e
t 
 (1.2351) (4.2272) 
 
The error correction representation for the Selected ARDL model is: 
 
 
Genoese Lira - Milanese Soldo.1590.3-1606.1 
Δi
t









LG/S  - 0.062704 + 0.97446 i
t
SM/S 
Genoese Lira - Milanese Soldo.1590.3-1621.3 
Δi
t









LG/S  - 0.051282 + 0.88786 i
t
SM/S 
Genoese Lira - Venetian Grosso. 1600.2-1621.3 
Δi
t









LG/S  - 1.1106 + 0.38811 i
t
GV/S  
Genoese Lira– Florentine Ducat. 1600.2-1621.3 
Δi
t
LG/S =  -0.61344e
t-1+ 0.32147Δi
t-1
LG/S  +  u
t 
   (-6.6502)   (3.1450) 
 
The coefficient of the error correction term, e
t-1 (close to –0.5), is statistically 
meaningful, has the correct sign and suggests a strong relation between the level 
variables in (5), i.e., the interest rates at the fairs of Milan, Florence, Venice and 
Bisenzone and a rapid movement towards equilibrium adjustment (in two 
quarters)
60.  
Figure 3 charts the relation between the interest rate of Lira, Soldo and Grosso. The 
45° line  - a0 = 0, a1 = 1, i.e. nil country risk and perfectly synchronized capital 






                                                 
60 Residuals have been tested for stationarity: 
 test  statistics 
Genoese Lira- Milanese Soldo   1591.1-1606.1  1591.1-1621.3 
Dickey-Fuller -8.9005  -12.0149 
Aug.Dickey-Fuller (lag: 1)  -4.5756  -8.5176 
Genoese Lira –Venetian Grosso   1601.2-1621.3 
Dickey-Fuller -10.8413 
Aug.Dickey-Fuller (lag: 3)  -3.7260 
Genoese Lira – Florentine Ducat  1600.4-1621.3 
Dickey-Fuller -8.8998 
Aug.Dickey-Fuller (lag: 1)  -4.8500 
95% critical value for the ADF:-2.8859; -2.9137   15 























Long run estimates referring to Genoa and Venice and Genoa and Florence report  
a0 > 0, a positive country risk in respect to Lira
61. This was a direct consequence of 
the risk connected with Genoa’s bankers heavy involvement in the asientos
62. The 
Genoese money market was directly affected by the bad news related to the King 
of Spain’s trustworthiness and to the arrival of his galleons, so that interest rates on 
short term financing through foreign bills of exchange in Genoa were at premium 
over Venetian and Florentine rates. Florence on the other hand was, at least in part, 
affected by the same rumours that affected the Genoese market. This was because 
Leghorn, Tuscany’s main port, was also involved in the shipment of the Spanish 
silver, and so the interest rate in Florence was influenced by the same cycle to that 
in Genoa. The econometric result for Genoa and Florence - a1 close to 1 - points to 
close co-movement of the two interest rates. 
Milan capital market was directly linked to Genoa and shared Genoa characters, 
both in terms of risk and fluctuations, a0 close to 0 and a1 close to 1. Genoese 
bankers had additional security collateral in the control they exercised over 
important Milanese sources of revenue: the Balbi, for example, were entitled to 
collect excise duties in the duchy of Milan [dazio sulla mercanzia] and had the 
monopoly of the wine and salt trade together with other privileges.  
The Genoa and Venice capital markets were not strictly linked. Venetian bankers’ 
involvement with Genoese bankers refinancing was frequent and was an 
indisputable source of revenue, with Venice acting as a secondary rechange market 
– but Venice was only indirectly influenced by the vagaries and the anxieties of the 
Genoese money market. The Venice money market was more greatly influenced by 
the respective trade conditions and it had an independent life of its own, a1 = 0,39. 
                                                 
61 The relationship between Lira and Grosso and between Lira and Ducat, are subject to limited data availability. 
The relatively short period of observation together with the 1606 crisis suggest a very cautious interpretation. 
62 The few available data for Naples seem to confirm our conclusions. Naples interest rates lie on a  straight line  
with a positive constant and a slope close to 1. Genoese capitalists had a critical role in 16
th century Naples, which 
was used by the Spanish Crown as a main financing center for the war in the Low Countries. By 1563, Genoese 
investors owned almost a quarter of the entire Neapolitan public debt (Calabria, Empire, p. 115). Because of war, 
Naples represented a high risk country, which accounts for the positive constant.   16 
The high Lira rate of interest on rechange was not a reflection of a Genoese tight 
capital market. Supply of capital in Genoa, at that time, was generally abundant 
and  long term interest rates on the Genoese public debt were lower than those in 
Venice, Milan Florence and Naples, while the short-term Lira interest rates at 
Bisenzone was generally higher than interest on other currencies. 
This was a curious inversion that can be only explained as being due to the more 
risky operations conducted by Genoese bankers, in connection with the asientos  
(table 3) 
 
Table. 3. Yearly interest rates on rechange in Bisenzone and on long –term loans in 
some Italian markets. 











Genoa Milan Venice Florence Naples 
1571-75        3.0   8   9.1 
1576-80        3.0  8    8.2 
1581-85        3.3     8.5 
1586-90        3.3   5   
1591-95  9.11  9.79    6.92*  3.4  7.5   5  
1596-1600  7.78  9.84     3.6 7   5  7.4 
1601-05  9.13 8.69 7.75 5.86    4.0 7  3.5 5   
1606-10  8.6 7.18 6.47      3.5   4 5 7 
1611-15  6.04 7.03 6.24 3.25    3.5    5  
1616-20  5.72 7.62 6.54 5.19    3.5   5 5   
1621-25  8.66 9.16 8.00 5.78    3.5   5 5   
1626-30 6.6  11.97     3.2   5 5   
* Years 1591-93 
Sources: Marsilio, 'Che interesse’; Giacchero, Seicento, pp. 676-78; Cuneo, 
Memorie, pp. 308-10; Pezzolo, Finanza; 
Pezzolo, “Istituzioni”, pp. 471-78; Calabria, Cost of empire, pp. 143 ff.; Mantelli, 




The diffusion of the Genoese fairs of exchange in Italy between 1550 and 1620 is 
both the result of the continuous demand for private loans from the Spanish Crown 
needed to support the expansionist war policies of Charles V and Philip II, and the 
fact that Genoa was at the center of the route from Seville, where American silver 
reached Europe, and the Levant, where silver was mostly needed. The Genoese 
acted on behalf of the Spanish crown to provide two fundamental services. The 
first involved the transfer of American silver to Spain and its conversion into gold 
which was used to pay military expenses in the Low Countries. The second 
involved the provision of short-term (frequently extended) credit to the Spanish 
crown. The Bisenzone fairs were central to both processes. The Genoese arranged 
international bills of exchange at the fairs and more importantly, they used northern 
Italian capital to finance their operations. 
The mobilization of capital involved the pactum de ricorsa and represented a 
financial innovation. Basically, the ricorsa involved Genoese bankers entering into 
contract with others and which meant that Genoese bankers entered a contract 
where they borrowed money in the  currency denominated by the lender. As a 
consequence the Genoese bore the exchange risk. The transactions took the form of   17 
balanced foreign bills of exchange, presumably because this was an established 
financial instrument and because it evaded Papal bans on usury. 
Lending to the King of Spain, through the asientos, was a risky operation but the 
reward was comparatively high. The Genoese were able to successfully manage 
their long-term lending to the King of Spain for several decades partly because 
Genoa occupied a crucial position along the silver transfer route to the Levant and 
partly because Genoese overall credit balance put them on a safe pedestal. Genoese 
were safely in charge of the management of the most important international 
medium term capital market of the time. “Rechange” renewed continuously. It 
spread the risk deriving from the funding of the Spanish debt over a wide market 
which involved many investors and granted high profits, in comparison with the 
limited alternatives available. The Bisenzone fair effectively integrated the key 
northern Italian financial markets: Genoa was directly linked to Milan because the 
Genoese had direct control of the Duchy of Milan, while Florence and Venice 
capital markets were more independent and less risky, not being directly involved 
with the asientos. 
The Bisenzone fair was a credit market with its own currency and a wide  and 
trusted network  . It was efficiently managed under Genoese law and under 
Genoese legal and political leadership. It was efficiently integrated in the global 
network which acted as a reservoir, pumping money out when needed. Although, 
with a hint of contempt, the Tuscans called Bisenzone  fiera senza luogo, [fair 
without a place] it was in many ways an important a capital market which operated 
on an international scale and was firmly backed by the seal of the Genoese state. 
The success of the financial operations that took place in Bisenzone provided the 
expertise on which the later merchant powers of North Western Europe were able 
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